One Man's Decision: Why SHAEF Failed to Halt the Bulge

Jay von Werlhof of the 114th Signal Radio Intelligence Company on the Order of Battle map that never reached First Army or SHAEF.

  • Ardennes, December 1944
  • 114th SRIC
  • First-hand account

It was 5:30 in the morning of 16 December 1944 when the distant crash of artillery and the rumble of tanks ended the military stalemate along the north-western front. The Battle of the Bulge was on.

Jay von Werlhof
114th Signal Radio Intelligence Company, U.S. Army

The Germans began this last and most brutal attack in the Second World War against a divided and weak Allied line. The sudden offensive overran the front line, sending Allied troops into headlong retreat and the surprised Supreme Headquarters of Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) command into hastily drawn but ineffective defences. The Germans rolled west unopposed except in the Elsenborn sector.

Since the St. Malo breakthrough in July, SHAEF headquarters and tactical field commanders had relied heavily on air reconnaissance and G2 (intelligence) ground units for detecting enemy troop movements. But in early December bad weather swept in from the North Sea, grounding the air force and shielding German movements from other visible means. For the first time the Allied commanders were forced to depend almost entirely on the G2 reports of the Signal Radio Intelligence companies for tactical information along the Western Front. Sporadic data from prisoners and espionage sources continued to filter through the line, but for continuity and reliability the daily G2 reports from the Signal Radio Intelligence companies operating near the front became the eyes of SHAEF.

By the end of 1944 there were eight Signal Radio Intelligence companies operating along the West Wall, including the 113th, 114th, 116th, 117th, 118th, 129th, 135th and 137th. In addition, there was the 113th Signal Radio Intelligence Battalion, attached to Lt. Gen. Omar Bradley's 12th Army Group.

The Mike Book

If the Allies immediately and obviously responded to intercepted information that the Germans were planning a particular move, the enemy would have suspected correctly that the Allies were on to their communications system. Even so, the Germans had to assume that a certain proportion of their messages were being intercepted, and they devised various means to at least slow down the process by which the Allies received those communications.

Following the Avranches breakthrough, the Germans revised the rather cumbersome way in which call signs and frequencies were changed. They published a book that showed, for each day, what call signs and radio frequencies were to be used over a six-month period. The changes were to take place as each day's operations began. The books were distributed to all German division headquarters, allowing a more rapid and smoother transition in message exchanges as a new day opened.

Unknown to the Germans, however, at least two of the books fell into the hands of the advancing First Army, who turned one over to the 114th Signal Radio Intelligence Company and, perhaps later, the Third Army's 118th company received the other. We nicknamed our book “the Mike Book”, since the German label for the book was prefixed with a capital M. Our traffic analysis section never told the intercept platoon how we knew what the changes were. That was one of our own top secrets.

Sometime after we bypassed Paris and were around Soissons or into Luxembourg, one of the American crews at army headquarters “lost” an Ultra decoding machine. Despite General Eisenhower's direct orders to “find that truck” containing the machine, it was never located. Probably it had fallen into German hands during some military move, for soon after that all intercepted messages appeared from random call signs and radio frequencies rather than the orderly changes the Mike Book had provided.

The only clue our intercept operators now had was from their familiarity with the “fist” of a particular sender — that is, his style of sending. The intercept operator immediately alerted his trick chief, who passed this important point along to the traffic analysis section, which then urged the operator to stay on the frequency and listen for additional clues or messages. Even that continuity with the past was lost as new replacement operators entered the field. The continuity we still had going, however, was the map that our Order of Battle section kept on the wall of its hutch. The direction-finding platoon gave us a five-point fix on the location of any sender who stayed on the air long enough for the crews to “shoot it” in. Though a frequency and call sign changed, the position of the sender might remain fixed over a few days. In itself this would have been a valuable piece of information on the static condition of the front, and possibly a clue to changes in transmission modes.

Linguists, librarians and Disney

Linguists in the traffic analysis unit could handle any written European language or dialect. Sgt. “Jeeter” McPheeter, for example, had a Ph.D. in European languages and taught Romance languages at the University of North Carolina. Joseph B. Rounds, who occupied the second half of my pup tent, had set up a library for the League of Nations, was on leave as head librarian of the Grosvenor Library in Buffalo, and spoke fluent French and German. Others in the unit covered the Slavonic languages. One of the members of our traffic analysis platoon was a personal friend of Walt Disney, who agreed to design the logo for our reorganised company. The original is in the National Archives.

A front of more than twenty miles

Our southernmost direction-finding unit was at the edge of the Ardennes, and our northernmost unit was near Eupen, giving us more than twenty miles of coverage of the north-western front. With this placement we were west of the central sector of V Corps. The 9th Infantry Division was to our north, the 2nd and 99th Infantry Divisions were to our east, and the 106th Infantry Division to our south-east. The V and VII Corps were fighting to the north-east of Eupen towards Aachen and the Roer River dams as the main elements of General Dwight D. Eisenhower's code-named Operation Queen. They were still within our sector but extended our range to forty miles. All of this was soon to change.

Petrol and ammunition were always in short supply. To prevent one fuel dump from German capture, the Americans poured 125,000 gallons into a ditch and torched it. At the time near Metz, when General Patton was complaining about petrol shortages for his tanks, the 114th intercepted a clear-text message from a panicky soldier that he and two others were guarding a 50,000-gallon petrol dump and needed help. We contacted headquarters, who saw to it that several aircraft supplied the help until a patrol could seize the site from the hapless defenders.

By 1 December the V and VII Corps had fought beyond Aachen, the ancient capital of Charlemagne, and were along the Roer River facing the 272nd Volksgrenadier Division. This drive under Operation Queen aimed to prevent the Germans from opening the Roer dams and flooding the Lower Roer Valley, which would have stopped General Hodge's drive towards Cologne. Successes at the Roer brought General Gerow's V Corps back to Monschau for regrouping and rest. This was just prior to the German counter-offensive.

As early as October, Hitler began pulling his best divisions from the Western Front for refitting in eastern Germany. His favourite, the Sixth SS Panzer Army, was brought up to full strength while the Fifth Panzer Army and the Seventh Army remained understaffed.

Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow's V Corps was holding the northern pocket of the Ardennes front. Within it, the 2nd Infantry Division under Maj. Gen. Walter M. Robertson held the right flank while Maj. Gen. Walter Lauer's 99th Infantry Division commanded the left. Adjoining the right flank of the V Corps was Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton's VIII Corps, composed of a cavalry regiment, three infantry divisions and one armoured division, all stretched out over a sixty-five mile course, with but 500 men per mile.

Even considering the activity along the Roer River, a military slowdown had been gradually evolving along the West Wall. As mid-December approached, the front was relatively quiet. In the north, General Hodges was anxious to continue Operation Queen to Düren on the east bank of the Roer, while in the south General George S. Patton was in the final stage of preparing his Third Army for the planned 19 December all-out offensive into the Saarland. In between these separated salients American troops were at rest or refitting, while unknown to their higher command the Germans were amassing for a major assault through this quiet sector of the Ardennes.

Hitler's plan, which he dubbed Wacht am Rhein, would supposedly propel three armies to Brussels and Antwerp and, in some mystic way, bring a quick end to the war. Readied on 15 December, they commanded 250,000 troops — 3,100 men per mile.

General der Panzertruppen Hasso-Eccard von Manteuffel's Fifth Panzer Army struck at the north edge of VIII Corps, and Seventh Army under General der Panzertruppen Erich von Brandenberger attacked to the south-west to stop General Patton's advance. With the Sixth SS Panzer Army were other units that had recently arrived from the east, notably the 12th Volksgrenadier Division, the 2nd SS Panzer Division and the 246th Volksgrenadier Division. In the Fifth Panzer Army was the Panzer Lehr Division, which had recently arrived by rail from Bulgaria. Also from the Eastern Front were the 26th and 62nd Volksgrenadier Divisions. From the Italian front came the tough 15th Panzer Grenadier Division. Specially trained were the new 560th and 18th Volksgrenadier Divisions, both ready to be battle-tempered.

The map behind the West Wall

General Patton is not known for graciousness, but it would be hard for any man to emulate his military penchant for daring and risk. However, he did appreciate meritoriousness in others, and awarded the 118th Signal Radio Intelligence Company, attached to the Third Army, a special plaque for outstanding service as a front-line unit. Military historians have highly complimented the 114th for the “excellent” coverage we had of German units during Operation Queen.

Of greater importance to us, however, was the Order of Battle that gradually emerged on our map of the Sixth SS Panzer Army. Even though Hitler had ordered strict radio silence for the three armies being stretched between Monschau and Echternach, the Sixth SS Panzer Army seemed to have trouble getting its complex units lined up in the few days before the attack. This army was the spearhead, and it was imperative that all units participating in the drive be fully organised. While the 114th received such data from Sixth SS Panzer Army divisions, companies covering other German armies adhering to the blackout did not receive similar messages. The effective tracking zone of our company was north-east of Eupen and south-east of St. Vith in General Hodges' First Army sector. Our area overlapped V, VII and VIII Corps. Though messages were usually very short, they showed over a few days a growing pattern of amassed power.

Our direction-finding platoon and cryptanalysis section detailed a concentration of armed might not known before, behind the West Wall. Some of the units could be identified, and our direction-finding platoon “shot in” many more. Operators recognising the “fists” of senders helped the Order of Battle section keep track of ground movements. Between 9 and 11 December the 114th constructed an impressive Order of Battle map.

The report that was not sent

While the daily reports we sent to First Army Headquarters and SHAEF showed increased activity east of the front, the lieutenant of our traffic analysis platoon, 1st Lt. “D”, refused to send our consolidated report and map of 11 December. He compared G2 records from First Army Headquarters with our data, and cited records that showed some of our identified units to be on the Eastern Front, destroyed, or in rest areas. Roy Duke, technical sergeant in charge of the operations of the traffic analysis platoon, discussed with Lt. “D” the difference between other G2 data and ours, but to no avail. To us these G2 data were obviously obsolete in a fast-changing tactical situation.

Capt. Alfred R. Braddock, 114th company commander, did not involve himself in intersectional matters, which gave each senior platoon lieutenant the final word. We immediately set to work redoing our report from additional field data. By 14 December we had added several units to the Order of Battle map and incorporated these data in a new report. Again our lieutenant refused to accept our report as credible military intelligence.

Traffic all but ceased on the afternoon of the 15th, apparently as the Sixth SS Panzer Army under General Dietrich, and the Kampfgruppe Peiper armoured regiment under SS Colonel Joachim Peiper, had the main elements of their attack force in line and ready to move. They now waited for zero hour.

G2 at army or SHAEF levels were very slow in sending their accumulated data to their field companies. Not all of their reported resources were reliable. Too, intelligence officers were not above political squabbles, as the intelligence head of First Army was not on good terms with the intelligence head of General Bradley's 12th Army Group — the 113th Signal Radio Intelligence Battalion — resulting in poor exchanges of data. On 14 December Eisenhower's G2 officer's Order of Battle map showed only four divisions facing the VIII Corps front line.

Up to the time of the attack at 5:30 on Saturday, 16 December, Eisenhower's Ultra provided no real clues that anything unusual was happening on the German side of the West Wall. The 118th and 137th companies did not report the kind of activity in their sectors that the Sixth SS Panzer Army passed on to the 114th. The other resources that G2 at army and SHAEF headquarters relied upon were not working, due to bad weather, bad assumptions, and radio silence in all but the Sixth SS Panzer Army sector. While other reports were based on rumour or partial truths, it seems the 114th was the only resource collecting hard data.

But it was one man's decision that kept the 114th's traffic analysis section from sending the only reliable and current reports available to First Army and SHAEF headquarters. In the ensuing battle the American total casualties were 80,987; German totals were 81,834. That is 162,821 men killed, wounded and missing. Had First Army and SHAEF received and accepted the 114th's report, there was time from the 11th to the 16th of December to blunt the attack. But one man's decision blocked that possibility.

Another view of the same week

Paul Seton of the 137th Signal Radio Intelligence Company's traffic analysis section remembered the same week from the Ninth Army's side of the line: warnings sent on 10 December, then passed from army to army, and finally a reprimand for going out of channels. His account is published in the 2nd Quarter 2003 issue of The ASA Interceptor.

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